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U.S. Supreme Court Decides that Digital is Different When it
comes to Constitutional Privacy Protections
This week, the Supreme Court unanimously concluded that warrants would be necessary for
police to search mobile phones. Ellen Goodman argues that the decision could impact the NSA’s
gathering of communications metadata and have implications for privacy and freedom of speech.
Continuing and strengthening a trend in U.S. privacy law, the Supreme Court decided on
Wednesday that the constitutional prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures (Fourth
Amendment) requires police to get a warrant before searching a mobile phone incident to arrest.
Two years ago, in United States v. Jones, another unanimous Court decided that law
enforcement needed a warrant to place a GPS device on a suspect’s car.  But that was because there was a
physical intrusion.  Here, in Riley v. California, the Court fully confronts for the first time the constitutional meaning
of digital data capture.  The question was whether theright of law enforcement “always recognized under English
and American law, to search the person of the accused when legally arrested to discover and seize the fruits or
evidences of crime” extends to searches of mobile phones.
The Court concluded unanimously that government could
not justify the warrantless search of mobile phones (and
presumably other electronic devices with similar
functions) on either of the traditional grounds: (1) the
interest in seizing weapons or the fruits or evidence of a
crime, or (2) the minimal additional intrusion on a suspect
already in custody.  Neither rationale holds up as
reasonable in light of the quantity and quality of
information that mobile phones contain.
Applying old law to new technology 
What does a 225 year old Constitution say about digital
privacy expectations?  Chief Justice Roberts seeks the
answer in Colonial Americans’ revulsion against the
“general warrants … which allowed British officers to
rummage through homes in an unrestrained search for
evidence of criminal activity.”  The question then
becomes whether the search of an electronic device
found in a pocket is more like the ransacking of a house
or the pat-down of a person.  After surveying the
capabilities of a smartphone, including location tracking,
records of Internet browsing history, cloud computing,
photographs, video, and apps, the Court sharply
distinguishes mobile phones from other physical objects. 
They are as alike as “a ride on horseback” is to “a flight to
the moon.” The rest of the decision grapples for the right
analogies, and concludes that:
Mobile phones are not like wallets.  The records they contain differ in terms of variety (mobile phone
records “reveal much more in combination than any isolated record”), type (a single record may “convey far
more than previously possible”), and provenance (“data on a phone can date back to the purchase of the
phone, or even earlier”).
Mobile phones are as sacrosanct as the home.  Justice Holmes once said that it was “a totally different
thing to search a man’s pockets and use against him what they contain, from ransacking his house for
everything which may incriminate him.” Chief Justice Roberts observes that “a cell phone search would
typically expose to the government far more than the most exhaustive search of a house.”
Including the metadata 
Of course the question on everyone’s mind is what this decision means for the legality of NSA warrantless data
mining.  Although it’s not controlling, the sensitivity to digital privacy issues revealed in this decision – reflecting
the views of all nine justices – has to make the NSA worry.  Interestingly, in a very brief passage, the Riley Court
rejects the government’s argument that at least law enforcement should be able to search a phone’s call log
information.  This is also known as “metadata” of the kind that the NSA has culled, and which at least one lower
court has held is entitled to Constitutional protection.  Without discussing it, the Court seemed sympathetic, noting
that this type of metadata can be very revealing and cannot be categorically distinguished from other data.
In what may be another precursor to some future consideration of NSA activities, the Court addressed the
government’s worries about officer safety should the phone communicate with criminal confederates or evidence
tampering should the phone be wiped remotely.  Often, these are the kinds of security concerns that trump privacy
interests.  But here, the Court insisted on a bright line rule as a general matter:  get a warrant.  Exceptions in
exigent circumstances will be allowed on a case-by-case basis.
Privacy and free speech implications 
The Riley case has implications not only for privacy, but also for free speech.  Notably, the New York Times and
other media organizations filed an amicus brief in this case, arguing that searches and seizures of mobile phones
incident to arrest is bad for journalism.  The brief provides many examples of journalists arrested in the course of
covering protests and police actions whose mobile phones were confiscated, searched, and sometimes returned
with data missing.  The nexus between Fourth Amendment privacy protections and First Amendment speech
protections is frequently visible, and in this case, it is especially clear.  Another unknown – and something to
watch – is how this decision impacts the search and seizure of electronic devices at the borders, especially when
in the hands of journalists.
This article originally appeared at the LSE’s Media Policy Project blog. 
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